CVE-2026-104203traccar authentication bypass by alternate path
CVE-2026-104203 is a authentication bypass by alternate path in traccar, rated high (7.5 on CVSS 3.1).
Why this priority: High severity, with no exploitation signal yet.
Published · Updated · NVD status: Deferred
What it is
A second route to a protected function skips the sign-in check. The software reveals data to someone who should not see it.
How it is reached
An attacker can exploit it over the network, without an account, and nobody has to click anything.
What an attacker gains
A successful attack can read the data it protects. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker act as a signed-in user, or an administrator, without valid credentials.
Is it being exploited?
There is no public report of exploitation yet. It can be exploited automatically, at scale. EPSS estimates a 0.80% chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, higher than 57% of scored CVEs.
What to do
- Upgrade traccar to 6.15.0 or later.
- Until it is patched, keep it off the internet or behind a VPN, allowlist or authenticating proxy.
Description from NVD
Traccar is an open source GPS tracking system. From 5.1 until 6.15.0, WebModule.java's MediaFilter Guice mapping and WebServer.java's Jetty ResourceServlet assign different routing meanings to path parameters at /api/media/*. An unauthenticated attacker who knows or guesses a device unique ID and media filename can insert a semicolon at the Servlet boundary, bypass MediaFilter's session and device authorization checks, and retrieve the protected media because Jetty still dispatches the noncanonical path to ResourceServlet. The demonstrated impact is read-only disclosure of a protected device media file; depending on the deployment and stored media, this could expose photographs, audio, video, or other uploaded files. The advisory does not establish directory listing, traversal, modification, account takeover, denial of service, or code execution. Reverse proxies that reject or rewrite semicolon path parameters may block the request. This issue is fixed in version 6.15.0.
What this means for your architecture.
A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.
Components it touches
- Sign-in, session and token handling. The flaw sits between anonymous callers and authenticated sessions.
- Identity providers and SSO. The flaw sits between anonymous callers and authenticated sessions.
- Error responses, logs and debug endpoints. The flaw sits between internal data and whoever can read the response or log.
- APIs that over-share. The flaw sits between internal data and whoever can read the response or log.
Trust boundaries in play
- Internet-facing entry points. No account is needed. Any instance reachable from outside your perimeter, through a load balancer, gateway, VPN or exposed admin port, is in scope.
- Between anonymous callers and authenticated sessions. An attacker who crosses it can act as a signed-in user, or an administrator, without valid credentials.
- Between internal data and whoever can read the response or log. An attacker who crosses it can learn data or internals that help a follow-up attack.
Questions to answer about your own systems
- Where does traccar run in your systems, and at which version?
- Which of those instances can be reached from the internet or partner networks?
- What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?
Sources
- CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
- Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
- Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.