CVE-2026-104254open-quantum-safe liboqs out-of-bounds read
CVE-2026-104254 is a out-of-bounds read in open-quantum-safe liboqs, rated medium (5.3 on CVSS 3.1).
Why this priority: Medium severity, with no exploitation signal.
Published · Updated · NVD status: Received
What it is
Code reads past the end of a buffer, leaking memory contents or crashing.
How it is reached
An attacker can exploit it over the network, without an account, and nobody has to click anything.
What an attacker gains
The direct impact is limited: partial access to data or a partial outage. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker crash the process, read memory, or in the worst case run code.
Is it being exploited?
There is no public report of exploitation yet. It can be exploited automatically, at scale.
What to do
- No fixed version is listed yet. Find every place open-quantum-safe liboqs runs, watch the references for a fix, and plan a replacement if it is no longer supported.
- While there is no fix, keep it off the internet or behind a VPN, allowlist or authenticating proxy.
Description from NVD
liboqs is a C-language cryptographic library that provides implementations of post-quantum cryptography algorithms. From 0.11.0 through 0.16.0, builds configured with OQS_ENABLE_SIG_STFL_LMS=ON can read beyond a caller-supplied signature buffer when an untrusted truncated LMS or HSS-LMS signature reaches OQS_SIG_STFL_verify or OQS_SIG_STFL_alg_lms_verify. In hss_validate_signature_init() in src/sig_stfl/lms/external/hss_verify_inc.c, consumed-length checks do not ensure that the bottom-level q and C fields remain available, allowing up to 32 bytes to be read past the buffer. In version 0.16.0, is_hss_public_key() also reads at offset 8 after only a four-byte length check, allowing an over-read of up to eight bytes. No valid signature is required, but the public key must be syntactically plausible. The read data is consumed only by an internal hash and is not exposed, so the supported impact is a possible verifier crash and denial of service, not memory disclosure or acceptance of an invalid signature. This issue is scheduled to be fixed in version 0.17.0.
What this means for your architecture.
A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.
Components it touches
- Native code: operating systems, browsers and firmware. The flaw sits wherever native code reads untrusted data.
- Network appliances and media or file parsers. The flaw sits wherever native code reads untrusted data.
Trust boundaries in play
- Internet-facing entry points. No account is needed. Any instance reachable from outside your perimeter, through a load balancer, gateway, VPN or exposed admin port, is in scope.
- Wherever native code reads untrusted data. An attacker who crosses it can crash the process, read memory, or in the worst case run code.
Questions to answer about your own systems
- Where does open-quantum-safe liboqs run in your systems, and at which version?
- Which of those instances can be reached from the internet or partner networks?
- What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?
Sources
- CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
- Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
- Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.