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CVE-2026-106096Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 link following

Low priorityMedium6.4EPSS not scored yet

CVE-2026-106096 is a link following in Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4, rated medium (6.4 on CVSS 3.1).

Why this priority: Medium severity, with no exploitation signal.

Published · Updated · NVD status: Awaiting Analysis

What it is

The software follows a symbolic link an attacker planted, so it reads or writes a file other than the one it checked.

How it is reached

An attacker can exploit it by someone who can already run code or sign in on the machine, with an ordinary user account, and nobody has to click anything. Success also depends on conditions the attacker does not fully control.

What an attacker gains

A successful attack can change data or behaviour. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker read or write files outside the folders the service meant to expose. The damage can spread past the vulnerable component into others.

Is it being exploited?

There is no public report of exploitation yet.

What to do

  1. No fixed version is listed yet. Find every place Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 runs, watch the references for a fix, and plan a replacement if it is no longer supported.
  2. Limit who can run code or sign in on the hosts that run it.

Description from NVD

A flaw was found in CRI-O. When the optional Linux LinkLogs feature is enabled, the host pod log directory is bind-mounted into a pod emptyDir and is intended to be read-only, but Linux ignores MS_RDONLY on the initial bind and the CRI mount stays writable. A non-privileged UID 0 container can place a symlink at a future kubelet log path so that privileged conmon later appends attacker-controlled log data to an existing host file. This is an append-only host integrity issue, not universal remote code execution; LinkLogs is not enabled by default.

What this means for your architecture.

A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.

Components it touches

  • File storage the service can read or write. The flaw sits between the application and the file system it can reach.

Trust boundaries in play

  • Host boundary. The attacker needs a foothold on the machine first; the flaw turns a small foothold into a bigger one.
  • Isolation between components. The impact crosses out of the vulnerable component into others it should be isolated from.
  • Between the application and the file system it can reach. An attacker who crosses it can read or write files outside the folders the service meant to expose.

Questions to answer about your own systems

  • Where does Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 run in your systems, and at which version?
  • Which of those hosts also run code or users you do not fully trust?
  • What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?

Sources

  • CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
  • Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
  • Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
  • Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.