CVE-2026-107496OpenSSL infinite loop
CVE-2026-107496 is a infinite loop in OpenSSL, not yet scored.
Why this priority: Not scored yet, and no exploitation signal.
Published · Updated · NVD status: Awaiting Analysis
What it is
Crafted input sends the software into a loop it never leaves.
How it is reached
The record does not say yet how the flaw is reached; the description below is the best guide until it is scored.
What an attacker gains
Its impact has not been scored yet. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker exhaust CPU, memory or connections until the service stops answering.
Is it being exploited?
There is no public report of exploitation yet.
What to do
- Upgrade OpenSSL to a fixed version for your release line (4.1.1, 4.0.4, 3.5.10).
Description from NVD
Issue summary: Encrypting a CMS message to an EC certificate whose group order is 1 may cause CMS_encrypt() or CMS_encrypt_ex() to loop indefinitely.
Impact summary: An attacker able to supply the recipient certificate to an application performing CMS encryption can cause that application to loop indefinitely, consuming CPU and resulting in Denial of Service.
CWE: CWE-835: Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop')
Description: CMS_encrypt() and CMS_encrypt_ex() encrypt a message to one or more recipient certificates and, for an EC recipient, generate an ephemeral key in the recipient's group. If the certificate declares a group order of 1, random scalar generation can only produce zero. The key generation routine then retries without limit while waiting for a nonzero private scalar, so the call never returns.
The OpenSSL TLS and QUIC implementations do not use this path. An application is exposed only if it calls CMS_encrypt() or CMS_encrypt_ex() with a recipient certificate whose EC parameters are attacker-controlled. Certificates with normal EC group orders do not trigger the loop.
OpenSSL 4.0 and later reject unknown explicit EC groups in default builds. These versions are affected only when configured with the enable-ec_explicit_curves option.
The result is a hang that consumes a CPU core until the process is interrupted, a Denial of Service. The severity is Low because the attacker must supply the recipient certificate and the application must choose to encrypt to it; ordinary CMS encryption to trusted recipients is unaffected.
The fix makes EC key generation fail when the group has no valid nonzero private scalar, instead of retrying indefinitely.
FIPS impact: no The FIPS modules in 4.1, 4.0, 3.5 and 3.0 are not affected. The FIPS provider does not support arbitrary explicit EC domain parameters, so an order-1 group is rejected during key import before the vulnerable key generation path is reached.
What this means for your architecture.
A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.
Components it touches
- Public entry points and shared services that must stay up. The flaw sits between untrusted traffic and shared capacity.
Trust boundaries in play
- Between untrusted traffic and shared capacity. An attacker who crosses it can exhaust CPU, memory or connections until the service stops answering.
Questions to answer about your own systems
- Where does OpenSSL run in your systems, and at which version?
- Which of those instances are reachable by people you do not trust?
- What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?
Read more
Sources
- CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
- Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
- Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.