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CVE-2026-107846bitcoinjs bitcoinjs-lib unchecked integrity value

High priorityCritical9.3EPSS 0.18%, higher than 8% of scored CVEs

CVE-2026-107846 is a unchecked integrity value in bitcoinjs bitcoinjs-lib, rated critical (9.3 on CVSS 4.0).

Why this priority: Critical, and reachable over the network without an account.

Published · Updated · NVD status: Received

What it is

A checksum or signature that should protect data is not verified properly.

How it is reached

An attacker can exploit it over the network, without an account, and nobody has to click anything.

What an attacker gains

A successful attack can change data or behaviour. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker read or tamper with traffic, or pass a forged message as genuine. The damage can spread past the vulnerable component into others.

Is it being exploited?

CISA's SSVC assessment notes a public proof of concept. It can be exploited automatically, at scale. EPSS estimates a 0.18% chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, higher than 8% of scored CVEs.

What to do

  1. Upgrade bitcoinjs bitcoinjs-lib to a fixed version for your release line (5.2.1, 6.1.8, 7.0.2).
  2. Until it is patched, keep it off the internet or behind a VPN, allowlist or authenticating proxy.

Description from NVD

bitcoinjs-lib is a JavaScript Bitcoin library for Node.js and browsers. From 2.3.0 until 5.2.1, 6.1.8, and 7.0.2, fastMerkleRoot pads odd Merkle-tree levels by hashing the final node with itself but does not report adjacent duplicate hashes. The affected block-root verifier was introduced as Block.checkMerkleRoot() alongside Block.calculateMerkleRoot(), while later versions expose validation through checkTxRoots() and __checkMerkleRoot; these validation paths can accept a recomputed root without checking for mutation. A peer can append duplicate transactions so a different transaction list retains the original Merkle root, block header, proof of work, and block identifier. Consumers that rely on block-root validation, including explorers, exchange indexers, or SPV clients, can process a duplicated transaction twice or blacklist the shared block hash and reject the honest block. This issue is fixed in versions 5.2.1, 6.1.8, and 7.0.2.

What this means for your architecture.

A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.

Components it touches

  • TLS termination and service-to-service channels. The flaw sits on the network path between clients and services.
  • Signature checks. The flaw sits on the network path between clients and services.

Trust boundaries in play

  • Internet-facing entry points. No account is needed. Any instance reachable from outside your perimeter, through a load balancer, gateway, VPN or exposed admin port, is in scope.
  • Isolation between components. The impact crosses out of the vulnerable component into others it should be isolated from.
  • On the network path between clients and services. An attacker who crosses it can read or tamper with traffic, or pass a forged message as genuine.

Questions to answer about your own systems

  • Where does bitcoinjs bitcoinjs-lib run in your systems, and at which version?
  • Which of those instances can be reached from the internet or partner networks?
  • What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?

Sources

  • CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
  • Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
  • Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
  • Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.