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CVE-2026-110782simplesamlphp saml2 improper authentication

Schedule itHigh8.7EPSS not scored yet

CVE-2026-110782 is a improper authentication in simplesamlphp saml2, rated high (8.7 on CVSS 3.1).

Why this priority: High severity, with no exploitation signal yet.

Published · Updated · NVD status: Received

What it is

The software does not prove who a caller is, so an attacker can pass as someone else. A cryptographic signature is not checked properly, so forged data is accepted.

How it is reached

An attacker can exploit it over the network, without an account, and nobody has to click anything. Success also depends on conditions the attacker does not fully control.

What an attacker gains

A successful attack can read the data it protects and change data or behaviour. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker act as a signed-in user, or an administrator, without valid credentials. The damage can spread past the vulnerable component into others.

Is it being exploited?

CISA's SSVC assessment notes a public proof of concept.

What to do

  1. Upgrade simplesamlphp saml2 to a fixed version for your release line (6.2.4, 7.0.0-rc2).
  2. Until it is patched, keep it off the internet or behind a VPN, allowlist or authenticating proxy.

Description from NVD

The SimpleSAMLphp SAML2 library is a PHP library for SAML2 related functionality. From 6.2.2 until 6.2.4 and 7.0.0-rc2, HTTPArtifact::receive() in src/Binding/HTTPArtifact.php verifies a signed outer ArtifactResponse but returns an unsigned embedded SAML Response before calling verifyMessageSignature(). The signed path verifies with the artifact issuer's metadata keys without requiring the embedded Response issuer to match that artifact issuer. In a multi-IdP federation, an attacker controlling one trusted IdP can therefore return a validly signed outer ArtifactResponse containing an unsigned Response that claims a different IdP, bypassing the binding's embedded-message authentication. End-to-end impersonation requires a service provider using HTTP-Artifact and a downstream consumer that relies on the binding to authenticate the embedded Response rather than independently requiring a signature. This issue is fixed in versions 6.2.4 and 7.0.0-rc2.

What this means for your architecture.

A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.

Components it touches

  • Sign-in, session and token handling. The flaw sits between anonymous callers and authenticated sessions.
  • Identity providers and SSO. The flaw sits between anonymous callers and authenticated sessions.
  • TLS termination and service-to-service channels. The flaw sits on the network path between clients and services.
  • Signature checks. The flaw sits on the network path between clients and services.

Trust boundaries in play

  • Internet-facing entry points. No account is needed. Any instance reachable from outside your perimeter, through a load balancer, gateway, VPN or exposed admin port, is in scope.
  • Isolation between components. The impact crosses out of the vulnerable component into others it should be isolated from.
  • Between anonymous callers and authenticated sessions. An attacker who crosses it can act as a signed-in user, or an administrator, without valid credentials.
  • On the network path between clients and services. An attacker who crosses it can read or tamper with traffic, or pass a forged message as genuine.

Questions to answer about your own systems

  • Where does simplesamlphp saml2 run in your systems, and at which version?
  • Which of those instances can be reached from the internet or partner networks?
  • What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?

Sources

  • CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
  • Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
  • Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
  • Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.