CVE-2026-110789libp2p js-libp2p inconsistent length field
CVE-2026-110789 is a inconsistent length field in libp2p js-libp2p, rated high (7.5 on CVSS 3.1).
Why this priority: High severity, with no exploitation signal yet.
Published · Updated · NVD status: Received
What it is
A length field in the data disagrees with the data itself, and the software trusts it. Requests can consume unbounded CPU, memory or connections and starve the service.
How it is reached
An attacker can exploit it over the network, without an account, and nobody has to click anything.
What an attacker gains
A successful attack can take it offline. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker crash the process, read memory, or in the worst case run code.
Is it being exploited?
There is no public report of exploitation yet.
What to do
- Upgrade libp2p js-libp2p to 3.3.8 or later. Other affected products have their own fixed versions on this page.
- Until it is patched, keep it off the internet or behind a VPN, allowlist or authenticating proxy.
Description from NVD
libp2p is a JavaScript implementation of the libp2p networking stack. Prior to 5.1.22, the @libp2p/crypto code reached by the default Identify service accepts a remote peer’s crafted publicKey before peer-id or signature verification and passes it through publicKeyFromProtobuf to the ASN.1 DER decoder. readLength in packages/crypto/src/keys/rsa/der.ts accepts long-form element lengths larger than the remaining buffer, causing readInteger and related readers to loop synchronously over an attacker-claimed length from a very small key blob. Because decoding occurs in one event-loop tick before the remotePeer equality check in packages/protocol-identify/src/identify.ts, the Identify timeout cannot interrupt it, allowing repeated unauthenticated connections to stall all timers and peers and transiently exhaust memory. This issue is fixed in version 5.1.22.
What this means for your architecture.
A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.
Components it touches
- Native code: operating systems, browsers and firmware. The flaw sits wherever native code reads untrusted data.
- Network appliances and media or file parsers. The flaw sits wherever native code reads untrusted data.
- Public entry points and shared services that must stay up. The flaw sits between untrusted traffic and shared capacity.
Trust boundaries in play
- Internet-facing entry points. No account is needed. Any instance reachable from outside your perimeter, through a load balancer, gateway, VPN or exposed admin port, is in scope.
- Wherever native code reads untrusted data. An attacker who crosses it can crash the process, read memory, or in the worst case run code.
- Between untrusted traffic and shared capacity. An attacker who crosses it can exhaust CPU, memory or connections until the service stops answering.
Questions to answer about your own systems
- Where does libp2p js-libp2p run in your systems, and at which version?
- Which of those instances can be reached from the internet or partner networks?
- What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?
Sources
- CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
- Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
- Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.