CVE-2026-112110Thalesgroup Safenet Authentication Client Service link following
CVE-2026-112110 is a link following in Thalesgroup Safenet Authentication Client Service, rated medium (5.8 on CVSS 4.0).
Why this priority: Medium severity, with no exploitation signal.
Published · Updated · NVD status: Awaiting Analysis
What it is
The software follows a symbolic link an attacker planted, so it reads or writes a file other than the one it checked. Something is checked, then changed by an attacker before it is used.
How it is reached
An attacker can exploit it by someone who can already run code or sign in on the machine, with an ordinary user account, and nobody has to click anything. Success also depends on conditions the attacker does not fully control.
What an attacker gains
A successful attack can change data or behaviour and take it offline. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker read or write files outside the folders the service meant to expose.
Is it being exploited?
There is no public report of exploitation yet. EPSS estimates a 0.10% chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, higher than 1% of scored CVEs.
What to do
- No fixed version is listed yet. Find every place Thalesgroup Safenet Authentication Client Service runs, watch the references for a fix, and plan a replacement if it is no longer supported.
- Limit who can run code or sign in on the hosts that run it.
Description from NVD
A time-of-check to time-of-use race condition in the SafeNet Authentication Client (SAC) SACSrv log-cleanup function can allow an authenticated, non-administrator local user to redirect a privileged file deletion operation outside the intended log directory.
This issue affects SAC releases up to and including 10.9 R3 GA (build 10.9.7449).
What this means for your architecture.
A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.
Components it touches
- File storage the service can read or write. The flaw sits between the application and the file system it can reach.
- Request handlers and jobs that share state. The flaw sits between concurrent requests or processes.
Trust boundaries in play
- Host boundary. The attacker needs a foothold on the machine first; the flaw turns a small foothold into a bigger one.
- Between the application and the file system it can reach. An attacker who crosses it can read or write files outside the folders the service meant to expose.
- Between concurrent requests or processes. An attacker who crosses it can win a timing window to bypass a check or corrupt shared state.
Questions to answer about your own systems
- Where does Thalesgroup Safenet Authentication Client Service run in your systems, and at which version?
- Which of those hosts also run code or users you do not fully trust?
- What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?
Sources
- CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
- Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
- Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.