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CVE-2026-113631ONLYOFFICE Docs (Document Server) missing authorization

Low priorityMedium6.5EPSS not scored yet

CVE-2026-113631 is a missing authorization in ONLYOFFICE Docs (Document Server), rated medium (6.5 on CVSS 3.1).

Why this priority: Medium severity, with no exploitation signal.

Published · Updated · NVD status: Received

What it is

An action never checks whether the caller is allowed to perform it. The server can be made to fetch an address of the attacker's choosing, including internal services and cloud metadata endpoints.

How it is reached

An attacker can exploit it over the network, with an ordinary user account, and nobody has to click anything.

What an attacker gains

A successful attack can read the data it protects. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker reach data or actions their role should not allow.

Is it being exploited?

There is no public report of exploitation yet.

What to do

  1. Upgrade ONLYOFFICE Docs (Document Server) to 10.0.0 or later.
  2. Until it is patched, review who holds accounts that can reach it.

Description from NVD

Incorrect authorization in the sendForm RPC handler and Session JWT reconnect handling in ONLYOFFICE Docs (Document Server) 9.4.0-129 on the official onlyoffice/documentserver container allows an authenticated view-only user to export a reconstructed copy of a document, including content the viewer never displayed such as custom XML, custom document properties and field instruction text, even when download and form-filling are disabled. The attacker reconnects with a valid Session JWT while substituting an attacker-controlled callback URL, which the Session JWT does not bind, then invokes sendForm over RPC, causing DocumentServer to send the reconstructed DOCX to that URL.

What this means for your architecture.

A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.

Components it touches

  • Permission checks in APIs and admin surfaces. The flaw sits between one role or tenant and another.
  • Multi-tenant services. The flaw sits between one role or tenant and another.
  • Services that fetch URLs or call other hosts for a caller. The flaw sits between the application and the internal network behind it.

Trust boundaries in play

  • Authenticated network access. An account is needed, so exposure follows who can sign in: customers, partners or staff.
  • Between one role or tenant and another. An attacker who crosses it can reach data or actions their role should not allow.
  • Between the application and the internal network behind it. An attacker who crosses it can make the server send requests into internal networks or cloud metadata.

Questions to answer about your own systems

  • Where does ONLYOFFICE Docs (Document Server) run in your systems, and at which version?
  • Which of those instances can be reached from the internet or partner networks?
  • What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?

Sources

  • CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
  • Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
  • Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
  • Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.