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CVE-2026-115409Eclipse KeyPont insufficient verification of data authenticity

Low priorityMedium6.5EPSS not scored yet

CVE-2026-115409 is a insufficient verification of data authenticity in Eclipse KeyPont, rated medium (6.5 on CVSS 3.1).

Why this priority: Medium severity, with no exploitation signal.

Published · Updated · NVD status: Received

What it is

Data is accepted without proof it came from where it claims.

How it is reached

An attacker can exploit it by someone who can already run code or sign in on the machine, with an ordinary user account, and nobody has to click anything.

What an attacker gains

A successful attack can change data or behaviour. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker read or tamper with traffic, or pass a forged message as genuine. The damage can spread past the vulnerable component into others.

Is it being exploited?

There is no public report of exploitation yet.

What to do

  1. Upgrade Eclipse KeyPont to 2.0.0-rc9 or later.
  2. Limit who can run code or sign in on the hosts that run it.

Description from NVD

In `github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11/v2` versions `<= 2.0.0-rc8` (and the deprecated v1 module paths `github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11 <= 1.6.8`, `github.com/ThalesGroup/crypto11 <= 1.7.0-rc1` and `github.com/ThalesIgnite/crypto11 <= 1.2.5`), the key-pair and certificate lookup functions (`FindKeyPair`, `FindKeyPairs`, `FindKeyPairsWithAttributes`, `FindAllKeyPairs`, the `FindRSAKeyPair*` family and `FindAllPairedCertificates`) pair a private key with a public key object, or with a certificate, by `CKA_ID`/`CKA_LABEL` alone, take the first match the token returns, and never verify that it belongs to the private key. PKCS#11 permits a session that has not logged in to create public token objects, so anyone able to open a session on the token — without the PIN — can plant a public key or certificate carrying a victim key's `CKA_ID` and label, and crypto11 may return it as that key's public half. An application that publishes or trusts `Signer.Public()` (a JWKS endpoint, a key registry, `authorized_keys`, a CSR) then publishes the attacker's key, and relying parties accept anything the attacker signs as coming from the service. On the v1 line the lookup also falls back to a class-and-key-type-only search when the private key has no `CKA_ID`, pairing a label-only private key with the first public key of its type on the token.

The v1 module paths are deprecated and will not be fixed; users should migrate to github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11/v2 version 2.0.0-rc9 or later.

What this means for your architecture.

A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.

Components it touches

  • TLS termination and service-to-service channels. The flaw sits on the network path between clients and services.
  • Signature checks. The flaw sits on the network path between clients and services.

Trust boundaries in play

  • Host boundary. The attacker needs a foothold on the machine first; the flaw turns a small foothold into a bigger one.
  • Isolation between components. The impact crosses out of the vulnerable component into others it should be isolated from.
  • On the network path between clients and services. An attacker who crosses it can read or tamper with traffic, or pass a forged message as genuine.

Questions to answer about your own systems

  • Where does Eclipse KeyPont run in your systems, and at which version?
  • Which of those hosts also run code or users you do not fully trust?
  • What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?

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Sources

  • CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
  • Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
  • Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
  • Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.