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CVE-2026-119077elextensions ELEX WordPress HelpDesk & Customer Ticketing System deserialization of untrusted data

High priorityCritical9.8EPSS 1.3%, higher than 72% of scored CVEs

CVE-2026-119077 is a deserialization of untrusted data in elextensions ELEX WordPress HelpDesk & Customer Ticketing System, rated critical (9.8 on CVSS 3.1).

Why this priority: Critical, and reachable over the network without an account.

Published · Updated · NVD status: Deferred

What it is

Serialized objects from outside are turned back into live objects, which a crafted payload can abuse to run code.

How it is reached

An attacker can exploit it over the network, without an account, and nobody has to click anything.

What an attacker gains

A successful attack can read the data it protects, change data or behaviour and take it offline. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker turn crafted data into code execution inside the receiving service.

Is it being exploited?

There is no public report of exploitation yet. EPSS estimates a 1.3% chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, higher than 72% of scored CVEs.

What to do

  1. No fixed version is listed yet. Find every place elextensions ELEX WordPress HelpDesk & Customer Ticketing System runs, watch the references for a fix, and plan a replacement if it is no longer supported.
  2. While there is no fix, keep it off the internet or behind a VPN, allowlist or authenticating proxy.

Description from NVD

The ELEX WordPress HelpDesk & Customer Ticketing System plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to PHP Object Injection in all versions up to, and including, 3.3.9 via the 'form (specifically the attacker-controlled ticket_label field inside the url-encoded form string)' parameter parameter. This is due to missing server-side authentication and the absence of a class allowlist on deserialization, with the only guard being a nonce publicly emitted on any page carrying the [wsdesk_support] shortcode. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to execute code on the server. A successful exploit requires a single anonymous GET to any public page carrying the [wsdesk_support] shortcode to harvest the publicly emitted wsdesk_nonce value, after which a single unauthenticated POST completes the attack.

What this means for your architecture.

A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.

Components it touches

  • WordPress sites and their plugins. Plugins run inside the site with its database access, and many sites are public.
  • APIs, queues and caches that accept serialized objects. The flaw sits between a message producer and the service that deserializes it.

Trust boundaries in play

  • Internet-facing entry points. No account is needed. Any instance reachable from outside your perimeter, through a load balancer, gateway, VPN or exposed admin port, is in scope.
  • Between a message producer and the service that deserializes it. An attacker who crosses it can turn crafted data into code execution inside the receiving service.

Questions to answer about your own systems

  • Where does elextensions ELEX WordPress HelpDesk & Customer Ticketing System run in your systems, and at which version?
  • Which of those instances can be reached from the internet or partner networks?
  • What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?

Sources

  • CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
  • Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
  • Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
  • Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.