CVE-2026-121745nvm-sh nvm vulnerability
CVE-2026-121745 is a vulnerability in nvm-sh nvm, rated low (2.0 on CVSS 4.0).
Why this priority: Low severity, with no exploitation signal.
Published · Updated · NVD status: Awaiting Analysis
What it is
The record does not classify the weakness yet; the description below says what the reporter found.
How it is reached
An attacker can exploit it by someone who can already run code or sign in on the machine, with an ordinary user account, and nobody has to click anything. Success also depends on conditions the attacker does not fully control.
What an attacker gains
The direct impact is limited: partial access to data or a partial outage.
Is it being exploited?
There is no public report of exploitation yet. EPSS estimates a 0.12% chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, higher than 2% of scored CVEs.
What to do
- Upgrade nvm-sh nvm to 0.41.0 or later.
- Limit who can run code or sign in on the hosts that run it.
Description from NVD
Node Version Manager (nvm) is a POSIX-compliant shell function for managing multiple node.js versions. In versions 0.40.0 through 0.40.8, when `NVM_AUTH_HEADER` is set, `nvm_download` passes the credential to curl or wget as a `--header "Authorization: ..."` command-line argument. Process arguments are visible to every local user (on Linux via `ps` or `/proc//cmdline` unless `/proc` is mounted with `hidepid=`; on macOS via `ps`), so another unprivileged account on the same machine can read the token while nvm is downloading during `nvm ls-remote`, `nvm install`, and similar commands, and gain whatever access it grants on the private mirror. Only users who set `NVM_AUTH_HEADER` on a host shared with other local accounts are affected. Version 0.41.0 passes the header to curl on stdin and to GNU Wget in a private temporary config file. BusyBox wget reads no config file, so when it is the only downloader available the header is still passed as an argument.
What this means for your architecture.
A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.
Components it touches
- nvm-sh nvm. Start from where it runs and what it is connected to.
Trust boundaries in play
- Host boundary. The attacker needs a foothold on the machine first; the flaw turns a small foothold into a bigger one.
Questions to answer about your own systems
- Where does nvm-sh nvm run in your systems, and at which version?
- Which of those hosts also run code or users you do not fully trust?
- What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?
Read more
Sources
- CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
- Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
- Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.