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CVE-2026-123746sensiolabs symfony authentication bypass by alternate path

Low priorityLow2.3EPSS not scored yet

CVE-2026-123746 is a authentication bypass by alternate path in sensiolabs symfony, rated low (2.3 on CVSS 4.0).

Why this priority: Low severity, with no exploitation signal.

Published · Updated · NVD status: Awaiting Analysis

What it is

A second route to a protected function skips the sign-in check.

How it is reached

An attacker can exploit it over the network, with an ordinary user account, and nobody has to click anything. Success also depends on conditions the attacker does not fully control.

What an attacker gains

The direct impact is limited: partial access to data or a partial outage. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker act as a signed-in user, or an administrator, without valid credentials.

Is it being exploited?

There is no public report of exploitation yet.

What to do

  1. No fixed version is listed yet. Find every place sensiolabs symfony runs, watch the references for a fix, and plan a replacement if it is no longer supported.
  2. While there is no fix, review who holds accounts that can reach it.

Description from NVD

The Symfony Security HTTP component AuthenticatorManager::authenticateUser() does not run the firewall user checker’s checkPostAuth() method when a user is authenticated programmatically, allowing an account rejected by a custom user checker, such as an expired account, to be authenticated in Symfony versions prior to 5.4.56, 6.x prior to 6.4.50, 7.x prior to 7.4.23, and 8.x prior to 8.1.11.

AuthenticatorManager::authenticateUser() is used by UserAuthenticatorInterface::authenticateUser() and by the SecurityBundle’s Security::login() to authenticate a user programmatically, but it does not dispatch the security.authentication.success event, on which checkPostAuth() runs. The fix for CVE-2024-50341 made Security::login() call checkPreAuth(), but checkPostAuth() was still skipped. As a result, an account rejected by a custom user checker in checkPostAuth() is refused by form login and the other authenticators of the firewall, but can still be authenticated programmatically.

Applications are affected when they use a custom user checker that rejects users in checkPostAuth() and authenticate users programmatically, for example after a password reset or an e-mail verification link. A user whose account is rejected can then obtain an authenticated session through that flow. The default user checker does nothing in checkPostAuth(), so the default configuration is not affected.

The fix makes AuthenticatorManager::authenticateUser() dispatch the security.authentication.success event once the token is created and before it is stored, as authentications through the firewall do, so that checkPostAuth() runs and can reject the user.

What this means for your architecture.

A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.

Components it touches

  • Sign-in, session and token handling. The flaw sits between anonymous callers and authenticated sessions.
  • Identity providers and SSO. The flaw sits between anonymous callers and authenticated sessions.

Trust boundaries in play

  • Authenticated network access. An account is needed, so exposure follows who can sign in: customers, partners or staff.
  • Between anonymous callers and authenticated sessions. An attacker who crosses it can act as a signed-in user, or an administrator, without valid credentials.

Questions to answer about your own systems

  • Where does sensiolabs symfony run in your systems, and at which version?
  • Which of those instances can be reached from the internet or partner networks?
  • What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?

Sources

  • CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
  • Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
  • Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
  • Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.