Skip to main content
veriom
Menu

Explore Veriom products, resources, and account pages.

CVE-2026-123802supertokens supertokens-core improper authentication

Schedule itHigh8.1EPSS not scored yet

CVE-2026-123802 is a improper authentication in supertokens supertokens-core, rated high (8.1 on CVSS 3.1).

Why this priority: High severity, with no exploitation signal yet.

Published · Updated · NVD status: Received

What it is

The software does not prove who a caller is, so an attacker can pass as someone else. Data is accepted without proof it came from where it claims.

How it is reached

An attacker can exploit it over the network, with an ordinary user account, and nobody has to click anything.

What an attacker gains

A successful attack can read the data it protects and change data or behaviour. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker act as a signed-in user, or an administrator, without valid credentials.

Is it being exploited?

There is no public report of exploitation yet.

What to do

  1. Upgrade supertokens supertokens-core to a fixed version for your release line (11.3.8, 11.4.8, 12.0.11).
  2. Until it is patched, review who holds accounts that can reach it.

Description from NVD

SuperTokens Core is an open source authentication server. From 11.3.0 until 11.3.8, 11.4.8, 12.0.11, 12.1.2, 12.2.1, and 12.3.1, a licensed deployment with a configured SAML client can authenticate an identity from an assertion that did not satisfy the audience check. When the identity provider uses assertion-level signing, an attacker who has a still-valid IdP-signed assertion naming the victim for any audience and the attacker's own valid assertion for the target audience can combine them because validateSamlResponseAudience accepts an audience from one assertion while extractAllClaims takes the final NameID and attributes from another; response-level signing does not expose this multi-assertion variant. Independently, an assertion from an identity provider configured for the target deployment but issued to another SuperTokens deployment using the shared default saml_sp_entity_id can satisfy the target's audience check. Successful exploitation authenticates the attacker as the victim IdP user. This issue is fixed in versions 11.3.8, 11.4.8, 12.0.11, 12.1.2, 12.2.1, and 12.3.1.

What this means for your architecture.

A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.

Components it touches

  • Sign-in, session and token handling. The flaw sits between anonymous callers and authenticated sessions.
  • Identity providers and SSO. The flaw sits between anonymous callers and authenticated sessions.
  • TLS termination and service-to-service channels. The flaw sits on the network path between clients and services.
  • Signature checks. The flaw sits on the network path between clients and services.

Trust boundaries in play

  • Authenticated network access. An account is needed, so exposure follows who can sign in: customers, partners or staff.
  • Between anonymous callers and authenticated sessions. An attacker who crosses it can act as a signed-in user, or an administrator, without valid credentials.
  • On the network path between clients and services. An attacker who crosses it can read or tamper with traffic, or pass a forged message as genuine.
  • Between one role or tenant and another. An attacker who crosses it can reach data or actions their role should not allow.

Questions to answer about your own systems

  • Where does supertokens supertokens-core run in your systems, and at which version?
  • Which of those instances can be reached from the internet or partner networks?
  • What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?
See how Veriom maps an architectureTake the interactive tour

Read more

Patches and commits

Sources

  • CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
  • Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
  • Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
  • Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.