CVE-2026-124466openemr server-side request forgery
CVE-2026-124466 is a server-side request forgery in openemr, rated medium (6.9 on CVSS 4.0).
Why this priority: A public proof of concept exists and exploitation can be automated.
Published · Updated · NVD status: Awaiting Analysis
What it is
The server can be made to fetch an address of the attacker's choosing, including internal services and cloud metadata endpoints.
How it is reached
An attacker can exploit it over the network, without an account, and nobody has to click anything.
What an attacker gains
The direct impact is limited: partial access to data or a partial outage. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker make the server send requests into internal networks or cloud metadata. The damage can spread past the vulnerable component into others.
Is it being exploited?
CISA's SSVC assessment notes a public proof of concept. It can be exploited automatically, at scale.
What to do
- Upgrade openemr to 8.4.0 or later.
- Until it is patched, keep it off the internet or behind a VPN, allowlist or authenticating proxy.
Description from NVD
OpenEMR before 8.4.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to make the server send HTTP requests by registering an OAuth2 client with an unvalidated jwks_uri. Attackers can trigger the fetch via the token introspection endpoint with an unsigned client_assertion to probe internal services and reach cloud metadata endpoints.
What this means for your architecture.
A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.
Components it touches
- Services that fetch URLs or call other hosts for a caller. The flaw sits between the application and the internal network behind it.
Trust boundaries in play
- Internet-facing entry points. No account is needed. Any instance reachable from outside your perimeter, through a load balancer, gateway, VPN or exposed admin port, is in scope.
- Isolation between components. The impact crosses out of the vulnerable component into others it should be isolated from.
- Between the application and the internal network behind it. An attacker who crosses it can make the server send requests into internal networks or cloud metadata.
Questions to answer about your own systems
- Where does openemr run in your systems, and at which version?
- Which of those instances can be reached from the internet or partner networks?
- What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?
Sources
- CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
- Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
- Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.