CVE-2026-125114novuhq novu server-side request forgery
CVE-2026-125114 is a server-side request forgery in novuhq novu, rated high (8.3 on CVSS 4.0).
Why this priority: High severity, with no exploitation signal yet.
Published · Updated · NVD status: Deferred
What it is
The server can be made to fetch an address of the attacker's choosing, including internal services and cloud metadata endpoints.
How it is reached
An attacker can exploit it over the network, with an ordinary user account, and nobody has to click anything.
What an attacker gains
A successful attack can read the data it protects. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker make the server send requests into internal networks or cloud metadata. The damage can spread past the vulnerable component into others.
Is it being exploited?
There is no public report of exploitation yet.
What to do
- Upgrade novuhq novu to 3.15.0 or later.
- Until it is patched, review who holds accounts that can reach it.
Description from NVD
Novu provides an API for sending notifications through multiple channels. Prior to 3.15.0, the conditions filter webhook in libs/application-generic/src/usecases/conditions-filter/conditions-filter.usecase.ts passes the user-configured child.webhookUrl directly to axios.post without calling validateUrlSsrf. Evaluating a workflow condition can therefore make the worker send a POST request to a private or link-local service and return the response data for condition evaluation. The response is stored in execution details and exposed through GET /execution-details, which can disclose credentials from POST-capable metadata services or data from internal services, although metadata endpoints that require GET are not reachable through this path. This issue is fixed in version 3.15.0.
What this means for your architecture.
A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.
Components it touches
- Services that fetch URLs or call other hosts for a caller. The flaw sits between the application and the internal network behind it.
Trust boundaries in play
- Authenticated network access. An account is needed, so exposure follows who can sign in: customers, partners or staff.
- Isolation between components. The impact crosses out of the vulnerable component into others it should be isolated from.
- Between the application and the internal network behind it. An attacker who crosses it can make the server send requests into internal networks or cloud metadata.
Questions to answer about your own systems
- Where does novuhq novu run in your systems, and at which version?
- Which of those instances can be reached from the internet or partner networks?
- What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?
Sources
- CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
- Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
- Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.