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CVE-2026-126062sparklemotion nokogiri XML external entity

Low priorityLow3.7EPSS not scored yet

CVE-2026-126062 is a XML external entity in sparklemotion nokogiri, rated low (3.7 on CVSS 3.1).

Why this priority: Low severity, with no exploitation signal.

Published · Updated · NVD status: Received

What it is

The XML parser resolves external entities, so a crafted document can read local files or reach internal hosts. The server can be made to fetch an address of the attacker's choosing, including internal services and cloud metadata endpoints.

How it is reached

An attacker can exploit it over the network, without an account, and nobody has to click anything. Success also depends on conditions the attacker does not fully control.

What an attacker gains

The direct impact is limited: partial access to data or a partial outage. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker read local files or reach internal hosts through the parser.

Is it being exploited?

There is no public report of exploitation yet.

What to do

  1. Upgrade sparklemotion nokogiri to 1.19.5 or later.
  2. Until it is patched, keep it off the internet or behind a VPN, allowlist or authenticating proxy.

Description from NVD

Nokogiri is an open source XML and HTML library for the Ruby programming language. Prior to 1.19.5, on JRuby, applications that parse untrusted XML with DTDLOAD, DTDVALID, or NOENT can have the NONET restriction bypassed when an external DTD or entity uses a short-form IPv4 host or uses absolute paths resolved against a network URL. The resolver can treat these identifiers as local and send a network request, potentially enabling server-side request forgery. CRuby and default parse options are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 1.19.5.

What this means for your architecture.

A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.

Components it touches

  • XML and document parsers in APIs and import features. The flaw sits between uploaded or posted documents and the service parsing them.
  • Services that fetch URLs or call other hosts for a caller. The flaw sits between the application and the internal network behind it.

Trust boundaries in play

  • Internet-facing entry points. No account is needed. Any instance reachable from outside your perimeter, through a load balancer, gateway, VPN or exposed admin port, is in scope.
  • Between uploaded or posted documents and the service parsing them. An attacker who crosses it can read local files or reach internal hosts through the parser.
  • Between the application and the internal network behind it. An attacker who crosses it can make the server send requests into internal networks or cloud metadata.

Questions to answer about your own systems

  • Where does sparklemotion nokogiri run in your systems, and at which version?
  • Which of those instances can be reached from the internet or partner networks?
  • What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?

Sources

  • CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
  • Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
  • Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
  • Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.