CVE-2026-129092CCC-Attestation attested-tls-poc time-of-check to time-of-use race
CVE-2026-129092 is a time-of-check to time-of-use race in CCC-Attestation attested-tls-poc, rated high (7.0 on CVSS 4.0).
Why this priority: High severity, with no exploitation signal yet.
Published · Updated · NVD status: Received
What it is
Something is checked, then changed by an attacker before it is used.
How it is reached
An attacker can exploit it by someone who can already run code or sign in on the machine, with an administrator account, and nobody has to click anything. Success also depends on conditions the attacker does not fully control.
What an attacker gains
A successful attack can read the data it protects and change data or behaviour. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker win a timing window to bypass a check or corrupt shared state.
Is it being exploited?
There is no public report of exploitation yet.
What to do
- No fixed version is listed yet. Find every place CCC-Attestation attested-tls-poc runs, watch the references for a fix, and plan a replacement if it is no longer supported.
- Limit who can run code or sign in on the hosts that run it.
Description from NVD
CCC Attestation SIG attested-tls-poc through commit 731ca82 contains a time-of-check time-of-use vulnerability because Evidence is appraised only once during the TLS handshake, without post-handshake re-attestation. Attackers with local access to the attesting endpoint can alter workload code, data, configuration, or attached devices like GPUs while peers keep trusting the original Evidence.
What this means for your architecture.
A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.
Components it touches
- Request handlers and jobs that share state. The flaw sits between concurrent requests or processes.
Trust boundaries in play
- Host boundary. The attacker needs a foothold on the machine first; the flaw turns a small foothold into a bigger one.
- Between concurrent requests or processes. An attacker who crosses it can win a timing window to bypass a check or corrupt shared state.
Questions to answer about your own systems
- Where does CCC-Attestation attested-tls-poc run in your systems, and at which version?
- Which of those hosts also run code or users you do not fully trust?
- What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?
Read more
Sources
- CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
- Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
- Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.