CVE-2026-129511Apache log4net log injection
CVE-2026-129511 is a log injection in Apache log4net, rated medium (5.3 on CVSS 3.1).
Why this priority: Medium severity, with no exploitation signal.
Published · Updated · NVD status: Received
What it is
Input is written to logs unescaped, so an attacker can forge or hide log entries.
How it is reached
An attacker can exploit it over the network, without an account, and nobody has to click anything.
What an attacker gains
The direct impact is limited: partial access to data or a partial outage. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker learn data or internals that help a follow-up attack.
Is it being exploited?
There is no public report of exploitation yet.
What to do
- Upgrade Apache log4net to 3.6.0 or later.
- Until it is patched, keep it off the internet or behind a VPN, allowlist or authenticating proxy.
Description from NVD
Improper Output Neutralization for Logs vulnerability in the FileAppender, RollingFileAppender, UdpAppender and SmtpAppender of Apache log4net.
Characters the configured encoding could not represent were converted by that encoding's best-fit fallback, which turns fullwidth characters such as U+FF1C, U+FF1E and U+FF02 into <, > and ". The conversion happened after XmlLayout or XmlLayoutSchemaLog4J had escaped the text, so a party whose data reaches a log message could forge complete log events in an XML log, for example a fake audit entry. On .NET Framework this needs no configuration where the ANSI code page is single-byte, since that is the default encoding; on .NET it needs a configured single-byte encoding such as ISO-8859-1. This is the best-fit conversion described by the WorstFit research.
This issue affects Apache log4net: from 1.2.9 before 3.6.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.6.0, which fixes the issue.
What this means for your architecture.
A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.
Components it touches
- Error responses, logs and debug endpoints. The flaw sits between internal data and whoever can read the response or log.
- APIs that over-share. The flaw sits between internal data and whoever can read the response or log.
Trust boundaries in play
- Internet-facing entry points. No account is needed. Any instance reachable from outside your perimeter, through a load balancer, gateway, VPN or exposed admin port, is in scope.
- Between internal data and whoever can read the response or log. An attacker who crosses it can learn data or internals that help a follow-up attack.
Questions to answer about your own systems
- Where does Apache log4net run in your systems, and at which version?
- Which of those instances can be reached from the internet or partner networks?
- What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?
Sources
- CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
- Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
- Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.