CVE-2026-129784os85 httpx deserialization of untrusted data
CVE-2026-129784 is a deserialization of untrusted data in os85 httpx, rated high (8.5 on CVSS 3.1).
Why this priority: High severity, with no exploitation signal yet.
Published · Updated · NVD status: Received
What it is
Serialized objects from outside are turned back into live objects, which a crafted payload can abuse to run code.
How it is reached
An attacker can exploit it over the network, with an ordinary user account, and nobody has to click anything. Success also depends on conditions the attacker does not fully control.
What an attacker gains
A successful attack can read the data it protects, change data or behaviour and take it offline. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker turn crafted data into code execution inside the receiving service. The damage can spread past the vulnerable component into others.
Is it being exploited?
There is no public report of exploitation yet.
What to do
- Upgrade os85 httpx to 1.9.1 or later.
- Until it is patched, review who holds accounts that can reach it.
Description from NVD
The httpx Ruby gem parses JSON response bodies through its transcoder layer. HTTPX::Response#json delegates to Transcoder::JSON.decode, and when the oj gem is loaded and multi_json is absent, the decoder falls back to json_load, which calls Oj.load(response.to_s) with no mode option. Oj.load defaults to :object mode, in which a response document can allocate any already-loaded Ruby class ("^o":"ClassName") and set its instance variables, or resolve a class or module reference ("^c":"Name"). An attacker who controls, or can influence, the URL an application fetches with HTTPX.get(url).json therefore controls object instantiation in the victim process. With a matching gadget chain, this issue can potentially cause remote code execution. Affects httpx 1.9.0; fixed in 1.9.1.
What this means for your architecture.
A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.
Components it touches
- APIs, queues and caches that accept serialized objects. The flaw sits between a message producer and the service that deserializes it.
Trust boundaries in play
- Authenticated network access. An account is needed, so exposure follows who can sign in: customers, partners or staff.
- Isolation between components. The impact crosses out of the vulnerable component into others it should be isolated from.
- Between a message producer and the service that deserializes it. An attacker who crosses it can turn crafted data into code execution inside the receiving service.
Questions to answer about your own systems
- Where does os85 httpx run in your systems, and at which version?
- Which of those instances can be reached from the internet or partner networks?
- What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?
Read more
Patches and commits
Sources
- CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
- Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
- Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.