CVE-2026-130290Open Object Rexx ooRexx inconsistent length field
CVE-2026-130290 is a inconsistent length field in Open Object Rexx ooRexx, rated high (7.9 on CVSS 3.1).
Why this priority: High severity, with no exploitation signal yet.
Published · Updated · NVD status: Received
What it is
A length field in the data disagrees with the data itself, and the software trusts it.
How it is reached
An attacker can exploit it by someone who can already run code or sign in on the machine, without an account, and nobody has to click anything.
What an attacker gains
A successful attack can read the data it protects. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker crash the process, read memory, or in the worst case run code. The damage can spread past the vulnerable component into others.
Is it being exploited?
There is no public report of exploitation yet.
What to do
- Upgrade Open Object Rexx ooRexx to 5.2.0 or later.
- Limit who can run code or sign in on the hosts that run it.
Description from NVD
In Open Object Rexx (ooRexx) before 5.2.0, RXAPI has a heap buffer over-read in a QueueManager DataQueue::addmethod. In particular, the code blindly trusts the message.parameter1 value provided by the client as the size used to fill the data from the queueData heap buffer. An attacker sends a large parameter1 value in an ADD_TO_SESSION_QUEUE or ADD_TO_NAMED_QUEUE message and then retrieves data with a PULL_FROM_SESSION_QUEUE message. (A very large value causes a process crash.)
What this means for your architecture.
A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.
Components it touches
- Native code: operating systems, browsers and firmware. The flaw sits wherever native code reads untrusted data.
- Network appliances and media or file parsers. The flaw sits wherever native code reads untrusted data.
Trust boundaries in play
- Host boundary. The attacker needs a foothold on the machine first; the flaw turns a small foothold into a bigger one.
- Isolation between components. The impact crosses out of the vulnerable component into others it should be isolated from.
- Wherever native code reads untrusted data. An attacker who crosses it can crash the process, read memory, or in the worst case run code.
Questions to answer about your own systems
- Where does Open Object Rexx ooRexx run in your systems, and at which version?
- Which of those hosts also run code or users you do not fully trust?
- What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?
Read more
Sources
- CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
- Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
- Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.