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CVE-2026-130623AWS aws-privateca-issuer unintended proxy

Low priorityMedium5.1EPSS not scored yet

CVE-2026-130623 is a unintended proxy in AWS aws-privateca-issuer, rated medium (5.1 on CVSS 4.0).

Why this priority: Medium severity, with no exploitation signal.

Published · Updated · NVD status: Received

What it is

The server can be made to relay requests to places the attacker cannot reach directly. A permission check exists but gets the answer wrong for some callers.

How it is reached

An attacker can exploit it over the network, with an ordinary user account, and nobody has to click anything. Success also depends on conditions the attacker does not fully control.

What an attacker gains

The direct impact is limited: partial access to data or a partial outage. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker make the server send requests into internal networks or cloud metadata. The damage can spread past the vulnerable component into others.

Is it being exploited?

There is no public report of exploitation yet.

What to do

  1. Upgrade AWS aws-privateca-issuer to a fixed version for your release line (1.12.0, 1.12.0-eksbuild.1).
  2. Until it is patched, review who holds accounts that can reach it.

Description from NVD

Incorrect authorization in the credential handling for namespace-scoped issuers in AWS Private CA Connector for Kubernetes (aws-privateca-issuer) before 1.12.0 might allow an authenticated remote user with permission to create namespace-scoped issuers to obtain certificates, including subordinate CA certificates, from every AWS Private CA and certificate template reachable by the controller's own AWS identity or by any IAM role that identity can assume. This happens because a namespace-scoped issuer that supplies no credentials, or sets only a role, falls back to the controller's own identity.

To remediate this issue, users should first update any namespace-scoped issuers that rely on the controller's identity to use their own credentials. Then, upgrade aws-privateca-issuer to version 1.12.0 or the AWS Private CA Connector for Kubernetes EKS add-on to version v1.12.0-eksbuild.1.

What this means for your architecture.

A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.

Components it touches

  • Services that fetch URLs or call other hosts for a caller. The flaw sits between the application and the internal network behind it.
  • Permission checks in APIs and admin surfaces. The flaw sits between one role or tenant and another.
  • Multi-tenant services. The flaw sits between one role or tenant and another.

Trust boundaries in play

  • Authenticated network access. An account is needed, so exposure follows who can sign in: customers, partners or staff.
  • Isolation between components. The impact crosses out of the vulnerable component into others it should be isolated from.
  • Between the application and the internal network behind it. An attacker who crosses it can make the server send requests into internal networks or cloud metadata.
  • Between one role or tenant and another. An attacker who crosses it can reach data or actions their role should not allow.

Questions to answer about your own systems

  • Where does AWS aws-privateca-issuer run in your systems, and at which version?
  • Which of those instances can be reached from the internet or partner networks?
  • What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?

Sources

  • CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
  • Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
  • Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
  • Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.