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CVE-2026-76101pavlo-v-chernykh keystore-go improper signature verification

Schedule itHigh7.1EPSS not scored yet

CVE-2026-76101 is a improper signature verification in pavlo-v-chernykh keystore-go, rated high (7.1 on CVSS 3.1).

Why this priority: High severity, with no exploitation signal yet.

Published · Updated · NVD status: Received

What it is

A cryptographic signature is not checked properly, so forged data is accepted. A checksum or signature that should protect data is not verified properly.

How it is reached

An attacker can exploit it by someone who can already run code or sign in on the machine, with an ordinary user account, and nobody has to click anything.

What an attacker gains

A successful attack can read the data it protects and change data or behaviour. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker read or tamper with traffic, or pass a forged message as genuine.

Is it being exploited?

There is no public report of exploitation yet.

What to do

  1. Upgrade pavlo-v-chernykh keystore-go to 3.0.0 or later.
  2. Limit who can run code or sign in on the hosts that run it.

Description from NVD

keystore-go is a Go implementation of the Java KeyStore encoder and decoder. In 2.1.0 and earlier, keystore.Decode in decoder.go does not check the error returned when reading the trailing SHA-1 integrity digest and bounds its comparison by the length of the digest actually read. If an attacker with write access removes the final 20-byte digest from a modified JKS file, the empty actual digest causes the comparison loop to execute zero times and Decode returns the parsed keystore without an error. For certificate-only stores using TrustedCertificateEntry values, this bypasses both tamper detection and password verification, allowing trusted CA certificates to be added or replaced without knowing the keystore password and potentially enabling interception or modification of TLS connections that trust the forged CA. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.0.

What this means for your architecture.

A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.

Components it touches

  • TLS termination and service-to-service channels. The flaw sits on the network path between clients and services.
  • Signature checks. The flaw sits on the network path between clients and services.

Trust boundaries in play

  • Host boundary. The attacker needs a foothold on the machine first; the flaw turns a small foothold into a bigger one.
  • On the network path between clients and services. An attacker who crosses it can read or tamper with traffic, or pass a forged message as genuine.

Questions to answer about your own systems

  • Where does pavlo-v-chernykh keystore-go run in your systems, and at which version?
  • Which of those hosts also run code or users you do not fully trust?
  • What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?

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Sources

  • CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
  • Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
  • Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
  • Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.