CVE-2026-77383bvisible mcp-ssh-manager OS command injection
CVE-2026-77383 is a OS command injection in bvisible mcp-ssh-manager, rated high (8.7 on CVSS 4.0).
Why this priority: High severity, with no exploitation signal yet.
Published · Updated · NVD status: Received
What it is
Input reaches an operating-system command line, letting an attacker run their own commands on the host.
How it is reached
An attacker can exploit it over the network, with an ordinary user account, and nobody has to click anything.
What an attacker gains
A successful attack can read the data it protects, change data or behaviour and take it offline. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker run commands or code with the privileges of the affected service.
Is it being exploited?
There is no public report of exploitation yet.
What to do
- Upgrade bvisible mcp-ssh-manager to 3.6.7 or later.
- Until it is patched, review who holds accounts that can reach it.
Description from NVD
mcp-ssh-manager is an MCP server for managing servers over SSH with human approval, an encrypted vault, and a live audit trail. Prior to 3.6.7, ssh_db_list, ssh_db_dump, ssh_db_import, and ssh_db_restore in src/database-manager.js interpolate caller-controlled database, table, collection, file path, user, host, port, and password values into shell-evaluated command strings without neutralization. Shell metacharacters in these arguments therefore execute arbitrary commands on the configured SSH target as the account used by the MCP server. ssh_db_list is classified as read-only and remains available in readonly and restricted server security modes, so this path bypasses the command-execution boundary those modes are intended to enforce. The dump and import builders are blocked in readonly mode but remain vulnerable in the default unrestricted mode. The earlier version 3.6.5 hardening covered only ssh_db_query query text; it did not protect the list, dump, import, or restore builders, or the connection flags used by query builders. This issue is fixed in version 3.6.7.
What this means for your architecture.
A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.
Components it touches
- Application servers and the hosts they run on. The flaw sits between untrusted input and code or command execution.
- Template engines. The flaw sits between untrusted input and code or command execution.
Trust boundaries in play
- Authenticated network access. An account is needed, so exposure follows who can sign in: customers, partners or staff.
- Between untrusted input and code or command execution. An attacker who crosses it can run commands or code with the privileges of the affected service.
Questions to answer about your own systems
- Where does bvisible mcp-ssh-manager run in your systems, and at which version?
- Which of those instances can be reached from the internet or partner networks?
- What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?
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Sources
- CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
- Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
- Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.