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CVE-2026-77597dmunozv04 iSponsorBlockTV server-side request forgery

Low priorityLow3.5EPSS not scored yet

CVE-2026-77597 is a server-side request forgery in dmunozv04 iSponsorBlockTV, rated low (3.5 on CVSS 3.1).

Why this priority: Low severity, with no exploitation signal.

Published · Updated · NVD status: Received

What it is

The server can be made to fetch an address of the attacker's choosing, including internal services and cloud metadata endpoints.

How it is reached

An attacker can exploit it from the same local network segment, without an account, but someone has to act first, such as opening a file or following a link.

What an attacker gains

The direct impact is limited: partial access to data or a partial outage. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker make the server send requests into internal networks or cloud metadata.

Is it being exploited?

There is no public report of exploitation yet.

What to do

  1. Upgrade dmunozv04 iSponsorBlockTV to 2.11.0 or later.
  2. Segment the networks that can reach it.
  3. Warn the people who use it, and filter files and links on the way in.

Description from NVD

iSponsorBlockTV is a SponsorBlock client for YouTube TV clients. Prior to 2.11.0, src/iSponsorBlockTV/dial_client.py trusts the SSDP LOCATION URL supplied by a local-network responder without validating its destination. During automatic discovery, this can cause an attacker-directed GET request and a constrained POST request to a path ending in /YouTube; the POST uses application-defined headers and an application-defined payload rather than attacker-selected request contents. The requests can reach internal services, but the detailed request behavior states that response data and errors are not returned to the attacker, making the demonstrated behavior blind SSRF with bounded integrity impact. This issue is fixed in version 2.11.0.

What this means for your architecture.

A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.

Components it touches

  • Services that fetch URLs or call other hosts for a caller. The flaw sits between the application and the internal network behind it.

Trust boundaries in play

  • Local network segment. The attacker must share a network segment with the target.
  • People who open files and links. Mail, chat and browsers are the delivery path.
  • Between the application and the internal network behind it. An attacker who crosses it can make the server send requests into internal networks or cloud metadata.

Questions to answer about your own systems

  • Where does dmunozv04 iSponsorBlockTV run in your systems, and at which version?
  • Which network segments can reach them?
  • What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?

Sources

  • CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
  • Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
  • Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
  • Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.