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CVE-2026-84155Ericsson CodeChecker insufficient session expiration

Low priorityMedium5.3EPSS not scored yet

CVE-2026-84155 is a insufficient session expiration in Ericsson CodeChecker, rated medium (5.3 on CVSS 4.0).

Why this priority: Medium severity, with no exploitation signal.

Published · Updated · NVD status: Received

What it is

Sessions stay valid long after they should end.

How it is reached

An attacker can exploit it by someone who can already run code or sign in on the machine, with an ordinary user account, but someone has to act first, such as opening a file or following a link. Success also depends on conditions the attacker does not fully control.

What an attacker gains

A successful attack can read the data it protects and change data or behaviour. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker act as a signed-in user, or an administrator, without valid credentials.

Is it being exploited?

CISA's SSVC assessment notes a public proof of concept.

What to do

  1. Upgrade Ericsson CodeChecker to 6.29.3 or later.
  2. Limit who can run code or sign in on the hosts that run it.
  3. Warn the people who use it, and filter files and links on the way in.

Description from NVD

CodeChecker's web server fails to fully invalidate a session token on logout when the server runs with more than one API worker process (the default). Each worker process maintains its own in-memory session cache; logout only clears the cache of the single worker that handles the request (plus the shared database record). Other workers continue to honor the destroyed token from their stale in-memory copies until the session's lifetime expires. An attacker who has captured a valid token can therefore keep impersonating the user after the user has logged out.

What this means for your architecture.

A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.

Components it touches

  • Sign-in, session and token handling. The flaw sits between anonymous callers and authenticated sessions.
  • Identity providers and SSO. The flaw sits between anonymous callers and authenticated sessions.

Trust boundaries in play

  • Host boundary. The attacker needs a foothold on the machine first; the flaw turns a small foothold into a bigger one.
  • People who open files and links. Mail, chat and browsers are the delivery path.
  • Between anonymous callers and authenticated sessions. An attacker who crosses it can act as a signed-in user, or an administrator, without valid credentials.

Questions to answer about your own systems

  • Where does Ericsson CodeChecker run in your systems, and at which version?
  • Which of those hosts also run code or users you do not fully trust?
  • What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?

Sources

  • CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
  • Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
  • Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
  • Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.