CVE-2026-84164Ericsson CodeChecker cross-site scripting
CVE-2026-84164 is a cross-site scripting in Ericsson CodeChecker, rated none (0.0 on CVSS 4.0).
Why this priority: None severity, with no exploitation signal.
Published · Updated · NVD status: Received
What it is
Input is written into a web page without escaping, so an attacker's script runs in the browser of anyone who views it.
How it is reached
An attacker can exploit it over the network, with an administrator account, but someone has to act first, such as opening a file or following a link.
What an attacker gains
The scored direct impact on the component itself is low. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker act inside a signed-in user's browser session.
Is it being exploited?
There is no public report of exploitation yet.
What to do
- Upgrade Ericsson CodeChecker to 6.29.3 or later.
- Until it is patched, review who holds accounts that can reach it.
- Warn the people who use it, and filter files and links on the way in.
Description from NVD
The HTML report that plist-to-html, CodeChecker parse --export html and CodeChecker cmd diff --output html generate puts the report message, the checker name and the source file path into a script block through json.dumps. json.dumps does not escape the less-than character, so a closing script tag in any of those three fields ends the script element and what follows is parsed as HTML.
The input author is whoever controls the analysed tree or a third-party result file that report-converter ingests, or who holds PRODUCT_STORE in the cmd diff flow. The viewer is somebody else: docs/jenkins_gerrit_integration.md documents writing the report into Jenkins userContent and posting its URL into a Gerrit review. One caveat worth stating up front is that Jenkins serves userContent under a restrictive CSP that would block an inline handler, so that destination is probably safe as configured. The generated report sets no CSP of its own, so the impact lands wherever it is published without one.
What this means for your architecture.
A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.
Components it touches
- Web front ends and single-page apps. The flaw sits between a user's browser and the web application.
- Admin consoles served to a browser. The flaw sits between a user's browser and the web application.
Trust boundaries in play
- Authenticated network access. An account is needed, so exposure follows who can sign in: customers, partners or staff.
- People who open files and links. Mail, chat and browsers are the delivery path.
- Between a user's browser and the web application. An attacker who crosses it can act inside a signed-in user's browser session.
Questions to answer about your own systems
- Where does Ericsson CodeChecker run in your systems, and at which version?
- Which of those instances can be reached from the internet or partner networks?
- What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?
Sources
- CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
- Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
- Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.