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CVE-2026-88979kubeflow pipelines hard-coded credentials

High priorityMedium5.8EPSS not scored yet

CVE-2026-88979 is a hard-coded credentials in kubeflow pipelines, rated medium (5.8 on CVSS 3.1).

Why this priority: A public proof of concept exists and exploitation can be automated.

Published · Updated · NVD status: Awaiting Analysis

What it is

Credentials are built into the product, so anyone who knows them can sign in to every install. The server can be made to fetch an address of the attacker's choosing, including internal services and cloud metadata endpoints.

How it is reached

An attacker can exploit it over the network, without an account, and nobody has to click anything.

What an attacker gains

The direct impact is limited: partial access to data or a partial outage. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker sign in with credentials the vendor shipped or stored unprotected. The damage can spread past the vulnerable component into others.

Is it being exploited?

CISA's SSVC assessment notes a public proof of concept. It can be exploited automatically, at scale.

What to do

  1. Upgrade kubeflow pipelines to 2.18.0 or later.
  2. Until it is patched, keep it off the internet or behind a VPN, allowlist or authenticating proxy.

Description from NVD

Kubeflow Pipelines enables users to build and deploy portable, scalable machine learning workflows. From 2.17.0 until 2.18.0, the TensorBoard proxy token introduced by the incomplete remediation for CVE-2026-54745 uses MINIO_SECRET_KEY as its HMAC secret, whose bundled default is publicly known. In an authorization-disabled deployment using that default, an unauthenticated attacker can forge a token containing a chosen viewerName and namespace; the proxy constructs the destination from the viewerName plus the -service suffix, the namespace, and the configured cluster domain, then reads responses on port 80 under the /tensorboard/<viewer>/ path. Resource-name validation and path-traversal rejection remain enforced, authorization-enabled deployments still check access to the selected namespace, and unrestricted metadata access, writes, or service disruption are not established. This issue is fixed in version 2.18.0.

What this means for your architecture.

A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.

Components it touches

  • Credentials kept in code, configuration, images or firmware. The flaw sits between a stored secret and anyone who can read where it is kept.
  • Services that fetch URLs or call other hosts for a caller. The flaw sits between the application and the internal network behind it.

Trust boundaries in play

  • Internet-facing entry points. No account is needed. Any instance reachable from outside your perimeter, through a load balancer, gateway, VPN or exposed admin port, is in scope.
  • Isolation between components. The impact crosses out of the vulnerable component into others it should be isolated from.
  • Between a stored secret and anyone who can read where it is kept. An attacker who crosses it can sign in with credentials the vendor shipped or stored unprotected.
  • Between the application and the internal network behind it. An attacker who crosses it can make the server send requests into internal networks or cloud metadata.

Questions to answer about your own systems

  • Where does kubeflow pipelines run in your systems, and at which version?
  • Which of those instances can be reached from the internet or partner networks?
  • What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?

Sources

  • CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
  • Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
  • Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
  • Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.