CVE-2026-95826zephyrproject zephyr out-of-bounds write
CVE-2026-95826 is a out-of-bounds write in zephyrproject zephyr, rated high (7.5 on CVSS 3.1).
Why this priority: High severity, with no exploitation signal yet.
Published · Updated · NVD status: Awaiting Analysis
What it is
Code writes past the end of a buffer, corrupting memory in ways an attacker can often turn into code execution.
How it is reached
An attacker can exploit it from the same local network segment, without an account, and nobody has to click anything. Success also depends on conditions the attacker does not fully control.
What an attacker gains
A successful attack can read the data it protects, change data or behaviour and take it offline. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker crash the process, read memory, or in the worst case run code.
Is it being exploited?
There is no public report of exploitation yet.
What to do
- Upgrade zephyrproject zephyr to a fixed version for your release line (4.3.2, 4.5.0).
- Segment the networks that can reach it.
Description from NVD
The SMSC911x/LAN9220 Ethernet driver stages every outgoing frame in a fixed-size static buffer before pushing it to the controller FIFO. eth_tx() in drivers/ethernet/eth_smsc911x.c took the frame length from net_pkt_get_len(pkt) and passed it directly to net_pkt_read(pkt, tx_buf, total_len), with no comparison against the size of tx_buf (NET_ETH_MAX_FRAME_SIZE). net_pkt_read() takes no destination size and only fails when the packet is shorter than the requested length, so any packet longer than the staging buffer was copied past its end.
Nothing between the IP layer and the driver bounds the frame to what the link can carry: ethernet_send() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/ethernet.c performs no length check, and the IPv6 output path only compares the packet against the interface MTU when CONFIG_NET_IPV6_FRAGMENT is enabled (it is disabled by default). The size the stack will build is therefore governed by the interface MTU, and that MTU is remotely settable: handle_ra_input() in subsys/net/ip/ipv6_nbr.c honours the MTU option of any Router Advertisement with a value up to 0xffff, gated only by the standard hop-limit-255 and link-local-source checks. An unauthenticated attacker on the same link can raise the MTU and then have the device emit a single frame of several kilobytes, for example as a TCP segment from any service that returns more than ~1.5 KB or as an oversized UDP datagram.
The result is an out-of-bounds write into .bss immediately after tx_buf, with the overrun length and much of its content derived from the transmitted frame. Consequences range from corruption of adjacent kernel data and a crash to potential control-flow influence where the clobbered globals hold pointers; the practical overrun size is bounded by the network buffer pool rather than by the advertised MTU. The fix rejects frames larger than NET_ETH_MAX_FRAME_SIZE with -EMSGSIZE before any TX_DATA_PORT write, so the controller FIFO is also not left holding a command word without its payload.
What this means for your architecture.
A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.
Components it touches
- Native code: operating systems, browsers and firmware. The flaw sits wherever native code reads untrusted data.
- Network appliances and media or file parsers. The flaw sits wherever native code reads untrusted data.
Trust boundaries in play
- Local network segment. The attacker must share a network segment with the target.
- Wherever native code reads untrusted data. An attacker who crosses it can crash the process, read memory, or in the worst case run code.
Questions to answer about your own systems
- Where does zephyrproject zephyr run in your systems, and at which version?
- Which network segments can reach them?
- What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?
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Sources
- CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
- Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
- Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.