CVE-2026-95827zephyrproject zephyr memory leak
CVE-2026-95827 is a memory leak in zephyrproject zephyr, rated medium (6.5 on CVSS 3.1).
Why this priority: Medium severity, with no exploitation signal.
Published · Updated · NVD status: Awaiting Analysis
What it is
Memory is never released, so repeated requests exhaust it.
How it is reached
An attacker can exploit it from the same local network segment, without an account, and nobody has to click anything.
What an attacker gains
A successful attack can take it offline. In practice, this kind of flaw lets an attacker exhaust CPU, memory or connections until the service stops answering.
Is it being exploited?
There is no public report of exploitation yet.
What to do
- Upgrade zephyrproject zephyr to a fixed version for your release line (4.3.2, 4.5.0).
- Segment the networks that can reach it.
Description from NVD
The IPv6 neighbour discovery code in subsys/net/ip/ipv6_nbr.c keeps packets that are waiting for address resolution on a per-neighbour pending queue. A queued packet holds two references: the one handed over by the sender and a second one taken by net_ipv6_send_ns() when the packet is put on the queue. The Router Advertisement handler handle_ra_input() popped each packet off the queue and passed it to net_send_data(), relying on a trailing nbr_clear_ns_pending() call to release the queue reference — but that call then found the queue already empty and released nothing, so one reference was leaked for every pending packet flushed on an RA.
Router Advertisements are unauthenticated link-local ICMPv6 messages, so any node on the same link can trigger the flush. An attacker can make the leak deterministic by advertising itself as a router without a source link-layer address option, so the victim's neighbour entry stays INCOMPLETE, then inducing the victim to transmit through that next hop (the packet is queued and a neighbour solicitation is sent), leaving the solicitation unanswered and sending a further RA to drain the queue. Each round leaks one struct net_pkt together with its net_buf chain.
Leaked packets are never returned to the fixed-size pools, so the loss is permanent for the lifetime of the boot. With CONFIG_NET_PKT_TX_COUNT defaulting to 4 (14 with CONFIG_NET_PKT_LARGE_DEFAULTS), a small number of repetitions exhausts the transmit packet slab and the node stops being able to send any traffic. The impact is availability only: the reference count is always too high, never too low, so no use-after-free or memory corruption arises.
The fix moves the flush into a helper, nbr_send_pending(), which releases the queue reference for every packet it takes off the queue before handing the remaining reference to net_send_data(), and releases that one too if the send is refused.
What this means for your architecture.
A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.
Components it touches
- Public entry points and shared services that must stay up. The flaw sits between untrusted traffic and shared capacity.
Trust boundaries in play
- Local network segment. The attacker must share a network segment with the target.
- Between untrusted traffic and shared capacity. An attacker who crosses it can exhaust CPU, memory or connections until the service stops answering.
Questions to answer about your own systems
- Where does zephyrproject zephyr run in your systems, and at which version?
- Which network segments can reach them?
- What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?
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Sources
- CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
- Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
- Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.