CVE-2026-97041Go toolchain cmd/compile vulnerability
CVE-2026-97041 is a vulnerability in Go toolchain cmd/compile, not yet scored.
Why this priority: Not scored yet, and no exploitation signal.
Published · Updated · NVD status: Received
What it is
The record does not classify the weakness yet; the description below says what the reporter found.
How it is reached
The record does not say yet how the flaw is reached; the description below is the best guide until it is scored.
What an attacker gains
Its impact has not been scored yet.
Is it being exploited?
There is no public report of exploitation yet.
What to do
- Upgrade Go toolchain cmd/compile to a fixed version for your release line (1.26.11, 1.27.4). Other affected products have their own fixed versions on this page.
Description from NVD
Building a malicious package containing "//go:cgo_*" compiler directives could inject arbitrary flags into the external linker invocation on ELF platforms. The compiler and linker did not reject commas in "//go:cgo_import_dynamic", "//go:cgo_export_dynamic", "//go:cgo_export_static", "//go:cgo_import_static", and "//go:cgo_dynamic_linker" directives, and the linker passed the dynamic linker path using "-Wl,--dynamic-linker,<path>". Furthermore, the two-argument form of "//go:cgo_import_dynamic" (which is permitted in non-cgo Go source files) could overwrite the external symbol name of a symbol already marked for cgo export. A symbol name or dynamic linker path containing a comma or leading "@" could split "-Wl,--export-dynamic-symbol=" or "-Wl,--dynamic-linker," into arbitrary host linker flags or response file arguments. The compiler and linker now reject commas in "//go:cgo_*" symbol and dynamic linker directives, the linker passes "-Wl,--dynamic-linker=<path>", and "cgo_import_dynamic" no longer overwrites symbols exported via "cgo_export_dynamic" or "cgo_export_static".
What this means for your architecture.
A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.
Components it touches
- Go toolchain cmd/compile. Start from where it runs and what it is connected to.
Trust boundaries in play
Questions to answer about your own systems
- Where does Go toolchain cmd/compile run in your systems, and at which version?
- Which of those instances are reachable by people you do not trust?
- What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?
Sources
- CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
- Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
- Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.