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CVE-2026-99375Linux vulnerability

Low priorityNot scoredEPSS not scored yet

CVE-2026-99375 is a vulnerability in Linux, not yet scored.

Why this priority: Not scored yet, and no exploitation signal.

Published · Updated · NVD status: Received

What it is

The record does not classify the weakness yet; the description below says what the reporter found.

How it is reached

The record does not say yet how the flaw is reached; the description below is the best guide until it is scored.

What an attacker gains

Its impact has not been scored yet.

Is it being exploited?

There is no public report of exploitation yet.

What to do

  1. Upgrade Linux to a fixed version for your release line (6.12.117, 6.18.61, 7.3.2).

Description from NVD

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

NFSv4/flexfiles: fail I/O to the data server once a lock is lost

When a client loses a byte-range lock, because its lease expired and it may not recover the lock (nfs.recover_lost_locks=0) or because reclaim failed, it marks the lock state NFS_LOCK_LOST and fails further I/O by that lock owner. Otherwise an application that believes it holds a lock over a range is never told that the lock is gone, and can overwrite data that another client has since written under its own lock on that range.

The NFSv4 READ/WRITE and file layout I/O paths apply this in rpc_call_prepare, where nfs4_set_rw_stateid() returns -EIO for a lost lock. The flexfiles data server I/O path does not: the NFSv3 data server path never checked, and the check on the NFSv4 path was removed when the data server stateid began to be taken from the layout.

Fail read and write RPCs to the data server in rpc_call_prepare when the lock is lost. The data server path has no use for the stateid that nfs4_set_rw_stateid() selects, and selecting it looks up a delegation or open stateid on every I/O. Instead add nfs4_lock_context_lost(), which only tests NFS_LOCK_LOST, and check it alongside the open state. Its lookup, __nfs4_lookup_lock_state(), is split out of __nfs4_find_lock_state() and takes no reference: a lock state is only unlinked from state->lock_states under state->state_lock, so one found while holding that lock cannot be freed before it is released. Use it in nfs4_copy_lock_stateid() as well, which only reads the lock state under that lock. That drops a reference get and put from stateid selection for all NFSv4 I/O without changing the stateid selected.

Terminating the RPC in rpc_call_prepare is not enough on its own. The done callback reads the -EIO as a data server connection error, forgets the device ID, and resets the I/O to pNFS (or, for an NFSv4 data server, possibly to the MDS). After a reset to pNFS a new LAYOUTGET is granted and rpc_call_prepare fails the I/O again, without end. The existing NFS_CONTEXT_BAD check does not loop, since the open state is then invalid and pnfs_update_layout() fails the reset I/O, but it still forgets the device ID.

So when an RPC that was never sent fails and the open context is bad, the open state is invalid, or the lock is lost, complete it with -EIO without error handling. An RPC that was sent and failed is handled as before, so a real data server error is still reported to the MDS.

What this means for your architecture.

A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.

Components it touches

  • Linux. Start from where it runs and what it is connected to.

Trust boundaries in play

    Questions to answer about your own systems

    • Where does Linux run in your systems, and at which version?
    • Which of those instances are reachable by people you do not trust?
    • What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?

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    Sources

    • CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
    • Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
    • Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
    • Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.