CVE-2026-99468Linux vulnerability
CVE-2026-99468 is a vulnerability in Linux, not yet scored.
Why this priority: Not scored yet, and no exploitation signal.
Published · Updated · NVD status: Received
What it is
The record does not classify the weakness yet; the description below says what the reporter found.
How it is reached
The record does not say yet how the flaw is reached; the description below is the best guide until it is scored.
What an attacker gains
Its impact has not been scored yet.
Is it being exploited?
There is no public report of exploitation yet.
What to do
- Upgrade Linux to a fixed version for your release line (6.2, 6.12.117, 6.18.61).
Description from NVD
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: imx-jpeg: cancel timeout worker when streaming stops
Each per-fd context ctx owns a delayed_work (ctx->task_timer, callback mxc_jpeg_device_run_timeout) armed via schedule_delayed_work() at the end of mxc_jpeg_device_run() to recover a stalled encode/decode job. The only existing cancellation is cancel_delayed_work() in the frame-done IRQ handler, which de-queues a pending work item but does not wait for a callback that has already started, and it only runs when a frame completes.
When the fd is closed while a job is in flight (the frame-done IRQ has not fired yet), nothing syncs the worker before mxc_jpeg_release() frees ctx with kfree() after v4l2_m2m_ctx_release(). A queued or executing mxc_jpeg_device_run_timeout() can then recover ctx through container_of(&ctx->task_timer) and dereference it (ctx->mxc_jpeg, slot_data, dev_warn) after ctx has been freed.
Cancel the worker from mxc_jpeg_stop_streaming(). The cancel cannot live in mxc_jpeg_release(): mxc_jpeg_device_run() arms the timer while holding only hw_lock, not the mxc_jpeg->lock mutex that release holds, so a cancel in release could still race a concurrent mxc_jpeg_device_run() that re-arms the timer afterwards. mxc_jpeg_stop_streaming() instead runs inside v4l2_m2m_ctx_release() -> vb2_queue_release(), i.e. after v4l2_m2m_cancel_job() has set TRANS_ABORT and waited for any in-flight job to finish (so __v4l2_m2m_try_queue() will not queue and v4l2_m2m_try_run() will not run any further job for this context, which prevents mxc_jpeg_device_run() from re-arming the timer) and before the m2m context is freed. cancel_delayed_work_sync() removes a pending work item and waits for a running callback, so the worker can no longer race with the subsequent kfree(). The cancel is placed before the buffer-release loop so a concurrently running timeout callback cannot race with it over the same buffers. If the frame-done IRQ canceled a still-pending timer, this cancel is a no-op; if the timeout callback has already started, it waits for the callback to finish. The same mxc_jpeg_stop_streaming() call is also reached from VIDIOC_STREAMOFF, which drains the worker early, although STREAMOFF itself does not free ctx -- the use-after-free arises only when the fd is later closed.
This bug was found by static analysis.
What this means for your architecture.
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Components it touches
- Linux. Start from where it runs and what it is connected to.
Trust boundaries in play
Questions to answer about your own systems
- Where does Linux run in your systems, and at which version?
- Which of those instances are reachable by people you do not trust?
- What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?
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Sources
- CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
- Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
- Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.