CVE-2026-99671Linux vulnerability
CVE-2026-99671 is a vulnerability in Linux, not yet scored.
Why this priority: Not scored yet, and no exploitation signal.
Published · Updated · NVD status: Received
What it is
The record does not classify the weakness yet; the description below says what the reporter found.
How it is reached
The record does not say yet how the flaw is reached; the description below is the best guide until it is scored.
What an attacker gains
Its impact has not been scored yet.
Is it being exploited?
There is no public report of exploitation yet.
What to do
- Upgrade Linux to a fixed version for your release line (6.12.118, 6.18.64, 7.3.5).
Description from NVD
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: raw, isotp: copy socket options outside of lock_sock()
The CAN_RAW and CAN_ISOTP specific socket options are copied from and to user space while holding lock_sock(). A copy that faults or stalls, e.g. on a userfaultfd or FUSE backed mapping, holds lock_sock() for its whole duration.
raw_notify() and isotp_notify() take lock_sock() of a socket that is bound to the vanishing device while holding RTNL. As the CAN_RAW options can also be changed on a bound socket, a stalled copy can block RTNL on an unregistration or namespace change of the bound device. Before "can: protect the receive lists with a per-device lock", raw_setsockopt() even held RTNL itself during the copy. CAN_ISOTP only copies its options for unbound sockets, which isotp_notify() skips without taking lock_sock().
Keep the user space copies out of the locked sections: Check the option name and length and copy the option values, including the CAN_RAW_FILTER filters, to kernel memory before lock_sock(). raw_setsockopt_locked() and isotp_setsockopt_locked() get the copied values directly and drop their now redundant length checks and copies. As a side effect, a failing copy can not leave partially overwritten options behind anymore. In raw_getsockopt() duplicate the filters under lock_sock() and copy them to user space after release_sock().
As the option name and length are now checked before lock_sock(), the order of the checks in isotp_setsockopt() and accordingly the order of the returned error values changes. This is in line with POSIX, which does not define an order in which multiple error conditions are detected and reported.
The generic SOL_SOCKET options in sk_setsockopt() are not affected by this patch.
What this means for your architecture.
A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.
Components it touches
- Linux. Start from where it runs and what it is connected to.
Trust boundaries in play
Questions to answer about your own systems
- Where does Linux run in your systems, and at which version?
- Which of those instances are reachable by people you do not trust?
- What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?
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Sources
- CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
- Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
- Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.