CVE-2026-99673Linux vulnerability
CVE-2026-99673 is a vulnerability in Linux, not yet scored.
Why this priority: Not scored yet, and no exploitation signal.
Published · Updated · NVD status: Received
What it is
The record does not classify the weakness yet; the description below says what the reporter found.
How it is reached
The record does not say yet how the flaw is reached; the description below is the best guide until it is scored.
What an attacker gains
Its impact has not been scored yet.
Is it being exploited?
There is no public report of exploitation yet.
What to do
- Upgrade Linux to a fixed version for your release line (5.5, 5.11, 5.12).
Description from NVD
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: replace ARPHRD_CAN type checks with can_get_ml_priv()
Commit 4e096a18867a ("net: introduce CAN specific pointer in the struct net_device") introduced an explicit way to assign the midlayer private pointer (dev->ml_priv) to named users like ML_PRIV_CAN. A valid pointer returned by can_get_ml_priv() therefore identifies a real CAN device.
The referenced commit only converted the j1939 and proc code to this check, while the other parts of the CAN subsystem still rely on dev->type == ARPHRD_CAN.
The TUNSETLINK ioctl allows a down TUN/TAP device to set its hardware type to ARPHRD_CAN while dev->ml_priv remains NULL. Such a repurposed netdevice passes the ARPHRD_CAN checks.
Commit 8aa59e355949 ("can: af_can: fix NULL pointer dereference in can_rx_register()") already made can_rx_register() reject such devices. But can_rx_unregister() still only checks dev->type and dereferences the NULL ml_priv when it walks the receive lists of the device.
CAN_ISOTP reaches this path: isotp_bind() ignores the return values of can_rx_register() and binds the socket anyway. When the socket is released or the device is unregistered, isotp_release() and isotp_notify() remove the filters that have never been registered and trigger the NULL pointer dereference in can_rx_unregister(). This only requires owning a TUN/TAP device or CAP_NET_ADMIN in an unprivileged user namespace.
Convert the remaining ARPHRD_CAN checks in af_can, bcm, gw, isotp and raw to can_get_ml_priv().
What this means for your architecture.
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Components it touches
- Linux. Start from where it runs and what it is connected to.
Trust boundaries in play
Questions to answer about your own systems
- Where does Linux run in your systems, and at which version?
- Which of those instances are reachable by people you do not trust?
- What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?
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Sources
- CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
- Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
- Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.