CVE-2026-99773Linux vulnerability
CVE-2026-99773 is a vulnerability in Linux, not yet scored.
Why this priority: Not scored yet, and no exploitation signal.
Published · Updated · NVD status: Received
What it is
The record does not classify the weakness yet; the description below says what the reporter found.
How it is reached
The record does not say yet how the flaw is reached; the description below is the best guide until it is scored.
What an attacker gains
Its impact has not been scored yet.
Is it being exploited?
There is no public report of exploitation yet.
What to do
- Upgrade Linux to a fixed version for your release line (6.12.118, 6.18.64, 7.3.5).
Description from NVD
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/drm_crtc: ensure dma_fence_ops remain valid during device unbind
In [1], sashiko reported the following issue:
=== snip === Looking at how these fences are managed, drm_crtc_create_fence() creates a dma_fence without taking a reference to the drm_device or drm_crtc. Because the sync_file framework exposes this fence to userspace, the fence can outlive the CRTC.
The dma_fence contract requires that data accessed by dma_fence_ops (like get_driver_name) must remain valid for an RCU grace period after the fence is signaled. However, drm_crtc_cleanup() and the subsequent freeing of the device do not wait for an RCU grace period via synchronize_rcu().
If userspace calls ioctl(SYNC_IOC_FILE_INFO) concurrently with a device hot-unplug:
CPU1 (Userspace) sync_file_get_name() ops = rcu_dereference(fence->ops); if (!dma_fence_test_signaled_flag()) // Preempted or delayed here
CPU2 (Driver Teardown) Signals the fence (setting fence->ops = NULL) Destroys and frees the CRTC without waiting for an RCU grace period
CPU1 (Resumes) ops->get_driver_name(fence) -> drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name() crtc = fence_to_crtc(fence); // Casts to the freed CRTC return crtc->dev->driver->name; // Use-after-free
...
Does the CRTC or DRM device need to be kept alive for the RCU grace period, or should the fence hold a proper reference to prevent the use-after-free when get_driver_name() and get_timeline_name() access the freed CRTC structure? === snap ===
I believe this to be a correct observation and this patch implements the suggestion of waiting for an RCU grace period before proceeding with destruction of the drm_crtc, so that get_driver_name() and get_timeline_name() can still work.
What this means for your architecture.
A CVE names a product. Whether it matters depends on where that product sits in your systems: what reaches it, which trust boundary it guards and what it can reach once compromised. Veriom maps your components, their relationships and your trust boundaries from your code, cloud and delivery evidence, so you can see where a component like this sits. The radar itself does not look at your systems.
Components it touches
- Linux. Start from where it runs and what it is connected to.
Trust boundaries in play
Questions to answer about your own systems
- Where does Linux run in your systems, and at which version?
- Which of those instances are reachable by people you do not trust?
- What can it reach once compromised: which data stores, secrets and services?
14-day free trial
Understand how your systems connect.
See your services, dependencies and trust boundaries in one place, with evidence from your connected environment.
Sources
- CVE records and CVSS scores from the NVD CVE API. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- Exploitation status from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
- Exploit likelihood from FIRST’s Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), refreshed daily.
- Explanations are written by Veriom from fixed templates over each record’s data, not by a person reviewing each CVE. Descriptions are quoted from the records as published.